Logic, Natural Law, and Right Reason
In some of my reading lately, a connection occurred to me of the sort that is so obvious once consciously realized that you feel almost idiotic for not making the linkage before. G. K. Chesterton considered logic to be a tool, an instrument of reason to be used only in service of the truth. He writes,
In this Chesterton is emphasizing the importance of first principles, or principia. He summarizes it this way: “You can only find truth with logic if you have already found truth without it” (G. K. Chesterton, Daily News, Feb. 25, 1905). Taken by itself, logic alone is ambivalent, in the sense that it can be pressed into the service either of truth or of falsehood.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer makes a similar observation with regard to the natural law, understood as distinct from and not dependent on special revelation. He writes, for example in the case of the state,
In this way, Chesterton and Bonhoeffer make similar cases regarding the characteristics of logic and natural law, if both are abstracted from a dependence on biblical revelation.
This connection should not really be all that surprising, as Bonhoeffer himself identifies a created or natural law with reason: “Reason—law of what is created—of what exists” (Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “On the Possibility of the Church’s Message to the World,” in Ethics, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles West, and Douglass Stott, vol. 6, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005], 362).
All this follows a long tradition of relating natural law and reason in the Christian tradition, and is itself continuous with the contention of the Eminent Pagan, Cicero, who equates the two: “There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil” (Cicero, De Re Publica, Book III). Aquinas reiterates this connection, defining natural law as “the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law” (Summa Theologica, II.91.2).
Aquinas’ definition is cited approvingly by the Reformer Wolfgang Musculus, who says, “the lawe of nature is that light and iudgement of reason, whereby we doe discerne betwixt good and evill” (Wolfgang Musculus, Common places of Christian religion, trans. John Man [London: Henry Bynneman, 1578], 69). In this way, elements of both Protestant and Catholic natural law traditions have identified the natural law with “right reason,” picking up on the Ciceronian theme.
As Chesterton notes, the “rightness” of the reason depends on the proper foundation, that is, the truth of Biblical or special revelation. It is a fundamentally Augustinian point that reason alone, without illumination, cannot reach true first principles about the existence, attributes, and character of God. This is where the discontinuity between the pagan and Christian concepts of natural law come in. There is fundamental agreement about the methodology, so to speak, of natural law as “right reason,” but disagreement about the particular content of that rightness and the abilities of natural man to pursue it. For reason to be “right,” it needs the benefit of special revelation.
The relations of logic to truth depend, then, not upon its perfection as logic, but upon certain pre-logical faculties and certain pre-logical discoveries, upon the possession of those faculties, upon the power of making those discoveries. If a man starts with certain assumptions, he may be a good logician and a good citizen, a wise man, a successful figure. If he starts with certain other assumptions, he may be an equally good logician and a bankrupt, a criminal, a raving lunatic.
In this Chesterton is emphasizing the importance of first principles, or principia. He summarizes it this way: “You can only find truth with logic if you have already found truth without it” (G. K. Chesterton, Daily News, Feb. 25, 1905). Taken by itself, logic alone is ambivalent, in the sense that it can be pressed into the service either of truth or of falsehood.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer makes a similar observation with regard to the natural law, understood as distinct from and not dependent on special revelation. He writes, for example in the case of the state,
But both the concept of the contents of natural law are equivocal (depending on whether this natural law is derived from certain particular data or from certain particular standards); and it therefore fails to provide an adequate basis for the state. Natural law can furnish equally cogent arguments in favour of the state which is founded on force and the state which is founded on justice, for the nation-state and for imperialism, for democracy and for dictatorship (Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “State and Church,” in Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Neville Horton Smith [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995], 334).
In this way, Chesterton and Bonhoeffer make similar cases regarding the characteristics of logic and natural law, if both are abstracted from a dependence on biblical revelation.
This connection should not really be all that surprising, as Bonhoeffer himself identifies a created or natural law with reason: “Reason—law of what is created—of what exists” (Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “On the Possibility of the Church’s Message to the World,” in Ethics, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles West, and Douglass Stott, vol. 6, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005], 362).
All this follows a long tradition of relating natural law and reason in the Christian tradition, and is itself continuous with the contention of the Eminent Pagan, Cicero, who equates the two: “There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil” (Cicero, De Re Publica, Book III). Aquinas reiterates this connection, defining natural law as “the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law” (Summa Theologica, II.91.2).
Aquinas’ definition is cited approvingly by the Reformer Wolfgang Musculus, who says, “the lawe of nature is that light and iudgement of reason, whereby we doe discerne betwixt good and evill” (Wolfgang Musculus, Common places of Christian religion, trans. John Man [London: Henry Bynneman, 1578], 69). In this way, elements of both Protestant and Catholic natural law traditions have identified the natural law with “right reason,” picking up on the Ciceronian theme.
As Chesterton notes, the “rightness” of the reason depends on the proper foundation, that is, the truth of Biblical or special revelation. It is a fundamentally Augustinian point that reason alone, without illumination, cannot reach true first principles about the existence, attributes, and character of God. This is where the discontinuity between the pagan and Christian concepts of natural law come in. There is fundamental agreement about the methodology, so to speak, of natural law as “right reason,” but disagreement about the particular content of that rightness and the abilities of natural man to pursue it. For reason to be “right,” it needs the benefit of special revelation.
Comments
#1 2006-06-08 08:39 (Reply)
Well I think that Chesterton has it right, and Bonhoeffer does not. One of my old psychology lecturers enjoyed pointing out that syllogistic reasoning can be accurately and logically carried out on any mythical beast or power or substance, such as dragons or The Force or phlogiston, but the truth of it depends on starting with real observables.
CS Lewis in ‘The Abolition of Man’ (and elsewhere), makes it clear the PRECEPTS of the Natural Law (he calls it the ‘Tao’, Confucius wd be proud of him), are above all simply SEEN to be the case, that we should ‘do good and turn from evil’, qv, Psalm 34). That ‘do as you wd be done by’ and ‘do not do what you do want done to you’ are two sides of the same logical coin is a basic moral perception. You have to be taught these as moral facts, not decide if you agree or not. Grass is green, the sky is blue - you are taught the colours, it is not your choice or deduction. (And let there be no trivia about labels: ‘verde’ is green in Spanish, and ‘chloros’ is green in Greek, this is mere phonics.)
Bonhoeffer, like many a Protestant, is redefining the Natural Law to a lower status without explicitly stating his demotion from the Plato-Aristotle-Aquinas-Hooker classical standard. This is a biblical position (Rom. 2:15). He is trying to blindside the natural knowledge of good and evil (as the apostle Paul says ‘written on the heart’) because he wants to elevate the status of biblical revelation. Man is not so Fallen as that. If a man is pathologically or socio-pathologically incapable of seeing good and evil, right and wrong, he is eventually locked up, neutralised, or eliminated in one way or another. Bonhoeffer is too subjectivist and too relativistic for his own good, or at least the way he is presented here he is. If Man had no conscience before he was saved, he would have no guilt before he was saved, which is when his guilt is taken away! The Fall is not absolute in this respect. The corruption of the Will is also severe, but not complete. Martin Luther himself did not subscribe to so negative or subjectivist position as Bonhoeffer (see last chapter of ‘Written on the Heart’ by J. Budziefski for quotes.)
#2 2006-06-08 09:12 (Reply)
Michael,
Thanks for the thoughtful and engaging response. I think we read B. differently on this point, esp. as related to the one quote I passed on, which I doubt is enough to explicate a full view of B.’s view on the grounding of ethics. From this quote, B. seems to me to be making the same point as Chesterton...right reason, logic, or natural law, whatever you want to call it, needs to be founded on the correct first principles in order to work properly.
I have made the case elsewhere that B. is not Barthian on this point, although his formulation of natural law is not without its problematic aspects. To sum up very simply: B. argues for what I would call a Christological natural law, whose ontological foundation is in Christ the Logos. This natural law can be participated in by pagans, but they can never achieve true epistemic perspective on the One who is the ground for the world, the natural law, and so on. The end of the quote from above which I omitted may illumine this a bit more: “A solid basis is afforded only by the biblical derivation of government from Jesus Christ. Whether and to what extent a new natural law can be established on this foundation is a theological question which still remains open.”
Another relevant quote on the following page here: “for pagan government the answer is that there is a providential congruity between the contents of the second table and the inherent law of historical life itself. Failure to observe the second table destroys the very life which government is charged with preserving. Thus, if it is properly understood, the task of protecting life will itself lead to observance of the second table. Does this mean that the state is after all based on natural law? No; for in fact it is a matter here only of the government which does not understand itself but which now is, nevertheless, providentially enable to acquire the same knowledge, of crucial significance for its task, as is disclosed to the government which does understand itself in the true sense in Jesus Christ. One might, therefore, say that in this case natural law has its foundation in Jesus Christ.”
You also have to take into account what the term “natural law” is understood as within the context of the Barth-Brunner debate and the state of theology in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, that is, as something that can simply be argued from without any reference to or grounding in special revelation. The difference may be in what is understood as the necessary first principle, whether it is the moral observables you speak of, or the Bible. Aquinas, I think, inclines toward the latter, at least within the context of this discussion of the role of argumentation and logic.
In response to the question whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument Aquinas writes in part: "the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of fai!
th by reasoning, but only of answering his objections---if he has any---against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered."