Posts tagged with: European Central Bank

On The American Spectator, Acton Research Director Samuel Gregg observes that, “as evidence for the European social model’s severe dysfunctionality continues to mount before our eyes, the American left is acutely aware how much it discredits its decades-old effort to take America down the same economic path.” Against this evidence, some liberals are pinning the blame on passing fiscal and currency imbalances. No, Gregg says, there’s “something even more fundamental” behind the meltdown of the post-war West European social model. (Thanks to RealClearWorld for linking).

… this reality is that the Social Democratic project is coming apart at the seams under the weight of the economic policies and priorities pursued by most Social Democrats (whatever their party-designation) — including the American variety.

From the beginning, post-war Social Democracy’s goal (to which much of Europe’s right also subscribes) was to use the state to realize as much economic security and equality as possible, without resorting to the outright collectivization pursued by the comrades in the East. In policy-terms, that meant extensive regulation, legal privileges for trade unions, “free” healthcare, subsidies and special breaks for politically-connected businesses, ever-growing social security programs, and legions of national and EU public sector workers to “manage” the regulatory-welfare state — all of which was presided over by an increasingly-inbred European political class (Europe’s real “1 percent”) with little-to-no experience of the private sector.

None of this was cost-free. It was financed by punishing taxation and, particularly in recent years, public and private debt. In terms of outcomes, it has produced some of the developed world’s worst long-term unemployment rates, steadily-declining productivity, and risk-averse private sectors.

Above all, it slowly strangled the living daylights out of economic freedom in much of Europe. Without Germany (which, incidentally, also engaged in welfare reform and considerable economic liberalization in the 2000s), it’s hard to avoid concluding that Social Democratic Europe would have imploded long ago.

Read “The American Left’s European Nightmare” by Samuel Gregg on The American Spectator.

Blog author: jcouretas
posted by on Tuesday, November 22, 2011

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is congratulated in late September after the German parliament ratified key reforms of the eurozone's bailout fund

At National Review Online, Acton Research Director Samuel Gregg observes that “much of Europe’s political class seems willing to go to almost any lengths to save the euro — including, it seems, beyond the bounds permitted by EU treaty law and national constitutions.” Excerpt:

“We must re-establish the primacy of politics over the market.” That sentence, spoken a little while ago by Germany’s Angela Merkel, sums up the startlingly unoriginal character of the approach adopted by most EU politicians as they seek to save the common currency from what even Paul Krugman seems to concede is its current trajectory towards immolation.

As every good European career politician (is there any other type?) knows, the euro project was never primarily about good economics, let alone a devious “neoliberal” conspiracy to let loose the dreaded market to wreck havoc upon unsuspecting Europeans. The euro was always essentially about the use of an economic tool to realize a political grand design: European unification. Major backers of the common currency back in the 1990s, such as Jacques Delors and Helmut Kohl, never hid the fact that this was their ultimate ambition. Nor did they trouble to hide their disdain of those who thought the whole enterprise would end in tears.

Read “Eurocracy Run Amuck” on NRO.

Blog author: jcouretas
posted by on Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Over at Public Discourse, a new article by Acton’s research director Samuel Gregg examines the deeper reasons behind the problems of the euro. In “Europe’s Monetary Sins,” Gregg points out that many of the euro’s present difficulties reflect a basic refusal of Europe’s political class to acknowledge some of the unpleasant economic realities associated with the EU’s social model, as well as a tendency to say one thing while really doing another. In short, Gregg argues that many of Europe’s economic predicaments flow from a crisis of truth, an unwillingness to recognize it, and the subsequent formulation of policy on the basis of untruths and half-truths. The most recent result of this process, Gregg says, is that the independence of the European Central Bank has been severely compromised:

Ever since its foundation in 1998, the ECB has been a whipping boy for European politicians from the left and right who argue that the ECB’s legally mandated priority of maintaining price stability has kept productivity and economic growth rates in the EU far below those of America. In reality, these problems have little to do with monetary policy and everything to do with low rates of entrepreneurship, unsustainable levels of welfare expenditure, an aversion to competition, high rates of public sector employment, and structural rigidities associated with some of the world’s most inflexible labor markets. Indeed, it is probable that the ECB’s avoidance of the low interest-rate policies adopted by the Federal Reserve in the 2000s may have made the 2008 recession in Europe more bearable than it might otherwise have been.

Against considerable political pressures, the ECB has hitherto doggedly defended its independence. All that, however, changed when the European Union decided to set up its 750-billion-euro bailout fund in early May 2010 to stabilize financial markets and rescue the holders of not only Greek government debt, but also, implicitly, the holders of any EU government debts that seemed shaky.