Posts tagged with: monetary policy

MoneyRoll

Note: This is the latest entry in the Acton blog series, “What Christians Should Know About Economics.” For other entries in the series see this post.

The Term: Money

What it Means: In economics, money is a broad term that refers to any financial instrument that can fulfill the functions of money (more on that in a moment).

There are three basic ways to exchange goods and services: gifting (e.g., I give you a banana, expecting nothing in return); barter (e.g., I give you a banana, in exchange you give me an apple); by using money (e.g., I give you a banana, in exchange you give me $1). Money was invented (and reinvented in every culture) because it makes exchanges easier than the barter system.

What Money Is: Money is a shared belief system used to simplify exchanges of goods and services. To be used as money people have to share a belief that the item —whether paper, gold, rocks, etc. — can perform three main functions: be a store of value, be used as a unit of account, and serve as a medium of exchange.

In the next section we’ll examine these functions. For now, here are two examples of how money serves as a shared belief system:
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Blog author: jcarter
posted by on Wednesday, April 2, 2014

money-and-justice-scales“If a society regards governmental manipulation of money as the antidote to economic challenges,” writes Acton research director Samuel Gregg at Public Discourse, “a type of poison will work its way through the body politic, undermining justice and the common good.”

Money: it’s on everyone’s mind sometimes. In recent years, however, many have suggested there are some fundamental problems with the way money presently functions in our economies.

No one is seriously denying money’s unique ability to serve simultaneously as a medium of exchange, a measure and store of value, and a means of calculation. Yet deep reservations about the current workings of the world’s monetary systems, both foreign and domestic, have been expressed by people ranging from Senator Rand Paul (who is fiercely critical of the Federal Reserve), to Pope Francis (who has denounced what he calls “the cult of money”) and France’s François Hollande (who once described “big finance” as his “greatest adversary”).

Read more . . .

Blog author: jballor
posted by on Wednesday, December 11, 2013

Broken bank 02In yesterday’s edition of The Transom, which I highly recommend, Ben Domenech included a discussion that places the debates over raising the minimum wage within the broader context of the effects of inflation more generally.

Here’s a section:

There shouldn’t be any debate about the reality of the problem that the costs of basic staples, health care, and higher education are chewing up ever-increasing portions of the median family budget which is, in inflation-adjusted terms, smaller than it’s been since 1995. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, over the past five years, the average prices for all goods are 7.7% higher; the average price of bread is 10.4% higher; and the average price of meat/poultry/fish/eggs is 16.2% higher. In the past decade, the average worker has paid 89 percent more toward their health care benefits, while their wages grew 31 percent. The rising costs of the government-fueled higher education bubble makes American parents concerned they can no longer afford to send their kids to college. On top of it all, Americans no longer feel confident about their ability to find a new job which can pay them enough to make up for the costs of these goods and services.

The problem is not that the cost of unskilled labor is too low. The problem is the costs of what workers can buy with the fruits of that labor are too high. And the reason for that is largely due to government and systems which socialize risk and insulate producers from reality, not the realities of a competitive marketplace. http://vlt.tc/16×9 Those who favor a free market response to these inequality-related concerns ought to view the minimum wage push as an opportunity to put forward an agenda that speaks to these real concerns with a gas & groceries agenda. This is not going to be solved by more government requirements which raise the cost of labor and will absolutely lead to more low-skilled unemployment: it is with an agenda that would smash the insulated systems which have led to these higher costs.

Ben goes on to outline in some detail what an agenda might look like, which includes “ending the government’s management Soviet-style programs of dairy and raisins.” Horror of horrors, the Daily Beast and dairy producers would have us believe that the result would be $8/gallon milk. I can’t be the only one who wonders what the market price of commodities from milk to oil and sugar might be without various protectionist measures and subsidy schemes.

Ben ends the section with a key question: “Some Republicans have taken up more populist anti-corporatist and anti-cronyist arguments in recent months, because they can read the same polls we do. But will they stand up to cronyism, or are they just interested in demagoguery on the issue until they hold the reins of power again?”
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Remember the “fiscal cliff”? It wasn’t a cliff.

Over at Neighborhood Effects, James Broughel asks the question, “Has the Sequester Hurt the Economy?”

So have the sequester cuts hurt the economy? One possible answer comes from a new paper by Scott Sumner of Bentley University. Sumner argues that cuts to government spending don’t have serious deleterious macroeconomic effects when the Federal Reserve is targeting inflation. This is because the Fed ensures that prices stay stable under an inflation targeting regime, which keeps demand stable even in the face of government spending cuts. Similarly, when the Fed stabilizes the price level it also offsets any beneficial effects that fiscal stimulus might have, which helps explain the lackluster results from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (aka the “stimulus”).

Implicit in Sumner’s theory is that expansionary austerity, or the idea that the economy can grow even in the face of large government spending cuts, is indeed possible. Some of my colleagues at the Mercatus Center have described other ways in which expansionary austerity is possible.

First of all, I would like to be clear that I do not disagree that “expansionary austerity” may be possible. Nor do I disagree that the sequester cuts have not significantly hurt the economy. However, while the sequester included spending cuts and, therefore, technically qualifies as “austerity,” it was not what everyone was making it out to be. (more…)

It’s no secret that the economy of the European Union is, ahem, struggling. But Vikas Bajaj says the global economy is worse than anyone seems to want to acknowledge:global-economic-growth

In a new report released on Tuesday, the International Monetary Fund says that China, India, Brazil, Mexico and other developing countries are growing more slowly than previously thought. That weakness, combined with Europe’s enduring recession and middling growth in the United States, means the global economy will grow at 3.1 percent this year, about the same as last year and down from the I.M.F.’s April forecast of 3.3 percent.

Developing economies are struggling for a variety of reasons. Some, like Brazil and Russia, are hurting because there is less demand for their exports in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. China is trying to reduce its reliance on exports and investments while increasing the importance of domestic consumer spending. Some countries are also under pressure as foreign investors start moving money out of emerging markets to invest it in the United States, where interest rates have risen in recent days.

Bajaj points out that economist have been talking about this for months, but the response has been “a collective shrug” from policy makers. The International Monetary Fund calls for nations’ policymakers to create more robust attempts to stimulate economies, but Bajaj worries: “Is anybody listening?”

At some point everyone has heard an idea being discussed in Washington, D.C. and thought or said, “That’s insane.” Americans generally recognize there is, more often than not, something not quite right about inside-the-Beltway thinking. But to those who have never lived or worked in the D.C. area, let me tell you: You don’t know the half of it.

Think of your craziest uncle, the one who when you visit for Thanksgiving has some pet theory about how to fix the economy. Now imagine that intelligent, highly educated people heard your crazy uncle’s idea and took it seriously. Now also try to imagine that the idea was taken seriously enough that it was being discussed in the business section of a major newspaper’s website. That is the culture that is D.C.

For example, today the Washington Post’s Wonkblog has a story about the “platinum coin option”, a method for President Obama to get around the debt ceiling:
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In today’s Wall Street Journal, Jon Hilsenrath and Kristina Peterson report, “The Federal Reserve is heading toward launching a new round of stimulus to buck up the weak economy, but stopped short of doing so right away.” The predicted means of stimulating the economy is another round of the unconventional policy of quantitative easing (QE), i.e. when a central bank purchases financial assets from the private sector with newly created money in effort to spark economic growth. Thus, the quantity of US dollars would be increased, debasing their value and causing inflation.

The authors note that this strategy has received significant criticism:

Critics say there is little more the Fed can do to help, having already pushed short-term interest rates to near zero. They contend its unconventional actions could do more damage by sparking inflation, and that in the meantime the Fed is punishing savers who are getting little return on their bond investments. (more…)

Acton’s director of research Samuel Gregg is up at Public Discourse, with a piece titled “Monetary Possibilities for a Post-Euro Europe.” With his usual mix of sophisticated economic analysis and reference to deep principles, Gregg considers European countries’ options should the eurozone fail. If that happens, he says, “European governments will have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to rethink the type of monetary order they wish to embrace.”

One such scenario is a three-way monetary division within the EU that reflects the differing political commitments and economic priorities of different nations. Germany and the more fiscally responsible eurozone members such as Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands could, for instance, decide to reconcile themselves to being the only ones with the necessary fiscal and monetary discipline to maintain a common currency.

Alongside this bloc would be two other groups. One would consist of those EU countries such as Britain, Sweden, and Denmark that have maintained their own monetary systems because of reservations about the euro’s implications for national sovereignty. Another group would include EU nations such as Greece, Portugal, and Italy that are simply unable or unwilling to embrace the disciplined monetary and fiscal policies required by a common currency; these nations would consequently find themselves outside the eurozone and reverting to their national currencies.

A more radical monetary opportunity for a post-euro EU would be currency competition. This was once proposed by Britain’s Margaret Thatcher as an alternative to the present common currency. Contemporary proposals for currency competition, such as that advanced by Philip Booth and Alberto Mingardi, involve the monetary authorities of different countries authorizing the use of currencies alongside the euro in domestic settings other than their own. Consumer choice rather than state sovereignty would thus ultimately determine which currencies were used.

Yet another option would be the embrace of what might be called a European gold standard. In the 1950s and 1960s, the German economist Wilhelm Röpke argued that European monetary integration could occur via a nucleus of countries agreeing to adhere to a gold standard, much as had happened somewhat spontaneously in the nineteenth century through a process of unilateral decision-making by individual countries. Once this had occurred, adherents of such a gold standard would have to insist upon all members maintaining monetary discipline as well as freedom and stability in foreign exchange markets.

The stability of the European currency would be assured not by EU bureaucrats, but by the gold standard itself, and by allowance for the expulsion of countries that abuse their big-boy privileges.

Britain just rejected an EU treaty because the Conservative Party decided Brussels was trying to capitalize on the Mediterranean crisis by grabbing more power. The three proposed currency models, Gregg argues, would maintain countries’ freedom by yanking monetary power from central bureaucrats who exercise political power. He reflects further on the composition and history of the eurozone, on the countries’ political and economic freedom, and on what Röpke would have to say in the rest of the piece.

In a recent article in the Washington Post, Juan Forero and Michael Birnbaum recommend that in the face of the looming specter of Greek debt default, Europe may learn a few lessons from South America. In particular, they point to the good example of Uruguay and the bad example of Argentina.

According to the authors,

In a story that may provide a lesson for Europe, one country, Uruguay, that was on the edge of financial oblivion organized a fast, orderly and negotiated response that revived the economy and ended a run on banks. Another, Argentina, spiraled into a chaotic default and remains a pariah in world financial markets.

The article lists a variety of reasons, such as tax evasion, political stagnation, and civil unrest, with regards to why Greece is in danger of becoming the next Argentina. There is one aspect, in particular, though, that sheds some interesting light on current monetary practice. According to the article,

Greece is hamstrung by its ties to the euro, which it cannot devalue to make its exports cheaper, and leaving the currency zone might prove even more painful.

Though currency debasement has been possible since time immemorial, it has become easier ever since the “Nixon Shock” of 1971, when the United States ended its tie to the gold standard, affecting every other nation which had tied its own currency to the U.S. dollar for the sake of stability. However, from that point on, most countries have been operating with purely fiat-based currency; a government’s central bank can print as much or as little money as they desire, since its value has no stable grounding. (Grounding the dollar’s value to a specific amount of gold prevented the U.S. from printing more money than gold that it could be exchanged for.)

In a recent article in the Journal of Markets & Morality, James Alvey highlights the analysis of James Buchanan on the ethics of public debt and default. With regards to default, Buchanan identified two common means: open default or concealed default through inflation. By inflating its currency, a country can, in effect, cheat its bondholders out of the amount promised to them by repaying its debts with debased money. To do so is effectively concealed default. Notably, Alvey writes, “Buchanan says that the U.S. government did ‘default on a large scale through inflation’ during the 1970s,” the very decade in which we left the gold standard.

What is fascinating about the current crisis with Greece is that its central bank does not have sole control of the euro. Despite being a fiat currency, its decentralized nature gives it a certain stability.  Concealed default is not an option for Greece, forcing it to make the hard decisions necessary to avert defaulting on its debt or to do so openly.

For more on the history and moral implications of currency debasement, see Juan de Mariana, Treatise on the Alteration of Money, recently translated and published by Christian’s Library Press.

When the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace needed an expert economist to assist in articulating the “Note” titled Towards Reforming the International Financial and Monetary Systems in the Context of Global Public Authority to feisty journalists at an Oct. 24 Vatican press conference, it called on the University of Rome “Tor Vergata” economics professor, Leonardo Becchetti.

For an English translation of the professor’s remarks at the Vatican press conference, go to the end of this post.

Prof. Becchetti is a local celebrity of sorts, whose TV time has increased since the outbreak of the global financial crisis and growing cynicism on the future of the European Union. He has provided his expert assessments and criticism to Italian news channels and late night talk show programs, and has become a “go-to guy” when speaking on the relationship of economics to human happiness, central banking and monetary policy. See his interview of the monetary policy and inflation:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=woOyekGo89g]

No doubt, Prof. Becchetti was charged with the very difficult task of articulating and defending some the Note’s bold economic and political prescriptions – usually a “no-fly zone” for Vatican officials. Moreover, in all fairness, Becchetti removed his professor’s hat to his best ability, while speaking in relatively plain language to the journalists, most of whom, like myself, do not hold PhDs in international finance and monetary policy.

What follows is the unofficial English translation (actually my own) of the transcript of Prof. Leonardo Becchetti’s presentation. Becchetti’s technical debriefing on the Note last Monday raised a few eyebrows and provoked some critical thinking on what the Vatican document said (and didn’t say) regarding international financial and monetary reform.

For example the following finer points jumped out when translating Becchetti’s remarks:

1. The logic that a global economy requires global governance seems not quite right. What about the Church’s traditional support of subsidiarity, that is, crises should be resolved at the local level of problem. The financial crisis is a pandemic and will require massive effort to resolve it, but local symptoms and outbreaks of this financial disease are manifest in unique ways from nation to nation. A single global monetary and financial authority might simply enforce a “one-size-fits-all” policy that is not practical in most countries. This logic smacks of the 20th century centralized economic planning that has proven destructive in Eastern Europe.

2. Becchetti’s analogy of the “long spoons” is not sensitive to the fact that, through human innovation, those same klutzy over-sized spoons can be creatively re-invented through human innovation to allow for self-feeding. For me, Becchetti’s long spoon analogy inspires ideas of spoon-feeding each other (i.e. receiving easy hand-outs) and not creative cooperation to resolve our financial crisis. If left to fend for ourselves, it might be a clumsy experience at first, but we will then be forced to find ingenious and independent ways of self-preservation.

3. It is true that our world is increasingly interdependent and this provides great opportunity for international solidarity and cooperation, but why use the term “formidable threat” when addressing the fact that first world job holders are feeling the heat of equally qualified laborers from developing countries? I like the thought that the first world feels the need to compete and intelligently find more efficient ways of production, but Becchetti’s subtle semantics seem to infer that Marxist class struggles are at play in devising a global financial peace plan .

4. Lastly, what evidence is there that a financial transaction tax on stock exchange activity will ease the pain and suffering of today’s struggling businesses and unemployed? How many ways have we tried to tax and redistribute our way to human fulfillment? Is this the missing link in international economic planning? Cannot someone speaking on behalf of the Church and who is an expert in economics and happiness, at least make some sort of plea for greater spiritual wealth and its redistribution (i.e. by becoming fulfilled in Christ evangelizing His Word)?

I am sure you will have more questions yourself. Please feel free to share your own opinions.

Translation of Prof. Leonardo Becchetti’s remarks (original Italian version)

The bright side of the [financial] crisis is that it represents a time of great opportunity.

The global financial crisis is an opportunity to reform the very architecture of the global financial system, strengthen the European Union in terms of harmonizing its fiscal policies, while progressing more swiftly toward a goal of political unity and increasing discipline over national fiscal policies.

The Vatican document focuses on two key issues:

i) Building a set of rules for global governance which, if possible, will be used as a framework [to guide] the actions of global institutions;

ii) Reforming the international financial system with a series of specific proposals.

Concerning point i), global governance is urgently needed to overcome the asymmetry caused by the globalization of markets, institutions and rules that remain predominantly national.

Globalization makes us increasingly interdependent and makes it practically impossible to ignore other countries whose problems once seemed so distant: Simul stabunt simul cadent [Latin for similar things fall together].

To give you a few examples, there are at least six fundamental elements of interdependence between economic and financial systems:

i) the American debt crisis is a problem that concerns not only [the U.S.] itself but savers around the world who have invested in it and in the largest economies, like China, that [in turn] have invested a substantial portion of their own reserves in [U.S.] treasury bonds;

ii) the Greek debt crisis and the likely reduction in the facevalue of this country’s bonds (between 20% and 60%) will result in serious losses on the balance sheets of the French and German banks that had invested in them;

iii) the presence of a huge mass of poor and underprivileged in the world, willing to work at wages much lower than those of our own employees (bearing equal credentials and who are also protected and unionized) is a formidable threat to the maintaining levels of wealth of high-income countries;

iv) exiting from the euro would have damaging effects not only on developing countries but also on Germany itself, which for years has enjoyed the advantage of exporting its goods to markets within the Eurozone without additional costs linked to exchange rates;

v) the coordination of central banks is now increasingly important in a globally integrated world; recently, developing countries have often complained that the expansionary monetary policies of American and European central banks (quantitative easing) have exported inflation into their countries;

vi) for some time now G-20 meetings have tried coordinate the policies of countries with deficits with those with surpluses to encourage the latter to adopt more expansionary policies to boost demand throughout the world.

The [current situation is like] a large table full of guests, each of which is given a very long spoon to eat with. The difference between hell and heaven in this familiar story is that in some guests use their spoons to clumsily and unsuccessfully feed themselves while others use their long spoons to feed each other. It is in the former situation which nation states find themselves in globally integrated markets as they try to pursue their own short-sighted and short-term interests. This becomes counterproductive, because it is only by cooperating with each other that we will be able to put an end to this financial crisis.

On the second point (the rules of financial markets), the document adopts some proposals already launched by the Dodd-Frank legislation in the United States and by the Vickers Commission in the United Kingdom, but which have not yet been implemented and are not in force due to a number of obstacles.

It is fundamental that the world of finance returns to its role of serving the real economy. To do so it is necessary to:

i) reduce the leverage of banks that are “too big to fail” (the disproportionate 30:1 leverageratio between short-term liabilities and long-term assets is among the main causes spreading the subprime crisis throughout the world).

ii) adopt the so-called Volcker Rule which prevents banks from doing proprietary trading with customer deposits.

iii) more severely regulate the trading of derivatives born from insurance instruments. In the real economy insurance policies are purchased when someone owns an actual asset to be insured, while in financial markets this occurs in no more than 5 percent of cases. For this purpose, there is an EU proposal to achieve this objective regarding the credit default swaps of government bonds.

A fourth proposal concerns the instituting of a tax on financial transactions for reasons explained in the following paragraph.

It is important to ask why the position on taxing financial transactions of economists and civil society (a majority EU citizens in fact are in favor) has changed radically in recent years.

Last year, 130 Italian economists signed an appeal in support [of the proposition], which garnered further support with a similar appeal put forth by 1000 economists from 53 countries and delivered to the Finance Ministers of G20 countries attending the 2011 Summit held in Washington, D.C. last April 14-15 (among the prominent signees were highly respected leaders such as Dani Rodrik, Tony Atkinson, Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs) See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/apr/13/robin-hood-tax-economists-letter
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There are two reasons for this change of opinion: the events of the global financial crisis and further evidence that has helped to alter some [former] prejudices.

Upon the advent of the global financial crisis, the public finances of some major Western countries have been severely weakened while bailing out banks and, consequently becoming new targets themselves of speculative attacks.

A part of the financial world has thus privatized profits, socialized losses, and then utilized public funds used to bailout those who had come to the rescue in the first place.

It is, therefore, understandable why the majority of public opinion believes that those working in the financial markets should, therefore, help pay for the costs of this crisis, the burden of which has been currently shared by the most vulnerable [taxpayers in society].

From this point of view the FTT responds to the simple demands of justice, which seems urgent, given the most recent current events, in order to maintain social cohesion within the Community.

The second reason for increased favor for such a tax stems from the shedding of prejudice.

Until recently the tax was considered inappropriate and not globally applicable should it involve capital from the country in which it was enforced.

This bias is unfounded, as documented in research conducted by the International Monetary Fund, because there are at least 23 countries today that unilaterally apply a transaction tax (which is none other than a stamp tax) without there ever having been any [from their respective countries]. (See. T. Matheson , Taxing Financial Transactions. Issues and Evidence, IMF WorkingPaper No 11/54, March 2011, 8).

The United Kingdom is the country with the highest tax transaction with the application of its Duty Stamp Tax on one single type of financial asset (0.005% duty on the value of shares owned and listed on the London Stock Exchange).

This tax raises about 5 billion pounds in revenues each year.

By way of this evidence [EU Commission President] Barroso’s proposal to establish such a tax in the EU correctly addresses a “harmonization” of taxes throughout Europe on financial transactions –and not of their first introduction.

The London [Stock Exchange] tax has provided an interesting example of tax avoidance, as some operators have exited the stock market to invest in new OTC derivatives (contracts for differences) which essentially consist of bets on variations in share prices.

It is interesting to note, therefore, that the transaction tax has now split the market into two: those really interested in investing in company shares and those who bet on short-term variations in prices.

Such [tax] avoidance is already implicitly considered in the Barroso proposal, which would extend taxation to derivatives (and thus also to contracts for differences). Such problems can also be countered by banning contracts for differences as is already the case in a major financial market, like the United States.

From a scientific perspective, there are numerous ways to measure the elasticity of volumes of transactions upon introducing such transaction taxes, demonstrating a conservative coefficient rather than supporting the capital hypothesis.

Another reason for why the cannot occur is that a very high frequency of financial operations benefit from being in close proximity to the Stock Exchange’s physical location, where the information is released firsthand electronically. (See: New York Times (2009): Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds). Moving away from the live center of market operations would mean losing such a [critical time] advantage.

One seemingly unfounded objection is the impact the tax will have is on the overall cost of capital.

To set the rate proposed by the Barroso tax proposal, calculations based on the capitalization models of expected future asset values show that this cost is basically null (See again: Matheson 2011).

The other objection is based on reduced liquidity caused by the tax within markets. This is a matter of opinion. How much cash do we really need? Dean Baker, in his commentary on this issue, says that the tax would spell a return to transaction costs and to the state of liquidity of some ten years ago – that is to say, returning to a period that was far more flourishing than the times we are currently experiencing.

The truth is that there is no solid evidence on the effects of this tax on [total] liquidity, but only a series of different models with opposing results depending on the particular type of microstructure of financial markets and competition models hypothesized by intermediaries.

Summing up the four main objections to the institution of such a tax ([1] the tax cannot be imposed except on a global level, [2] there would be no control over the , [3] the tax significantly increases the overall costs of capital, and [4] the tax reduces market liquidity, they are either are false or unsubstantiated based on factual evidence (the first two) or lack of proof (the latter two).

Regarding the above arguments, the transaction tax (certainly not a panacea for all evil) may just represent an important step in recalibrating the relationship between financial institutions and other reforms that can help to prevent a new financial crises, as advocated by the Dodd Frank legislation [in the U.S.] and the Vickers Commission in the United Kingdom (cf. the Volcker Rule, the deleveraging of “too big to fail” intermediaries, and penalizing capital requirements for riskier investments as opposed to ordinary credit) and the restoration of civil society’s confidence in the financial institutions we so urgently now depend on.