Yesterday I looked at the worth of human life, especially as relative to that of animal life.

Today I want to refine the discussion about the value of human life, by making a fine terminological distinction. It’s become commonplace for theologians to speak of the “infinite value” of human life. Here are some examples from representatives of major traditions within Christianity. Rod Benson, director of the Centre for Christian Ethics at the Baptist-affiliated Morling College in Australia, contends that “every person is of infinite intrinsic value.”

Pope John Paul II often spoke in this way. In a letter about biomedical experimentation, the pope wrote of “the absolute respect due to human life and to the infinite value of the human person, that is not tied to one’s external features or on the ability to relate to other members of society.”

“The human person, created in the image of God and called to progress toward the divine likeness, is unique and of infinite value,” says Fr. John Breck, professor of biblical interpretation and ethics at the St. Sergius Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris. I, too, have spoken in this way in the past, referring to “the infinite value of the human person created in God’s image.”

My criticism of all these uses, including mine, does not rise to the level of a substantive critique. Within the context of these statements, the meaning and intention of the use of the term infinite is clear and uncontroversial. My purpose here is to simply note the ambiguity in the term infinite and to suggest clarification and possible substitution of other terms that have overlapping meanings without the possible misconstrual.

There are at least two basic definitions for the word infinite: “Having no boundaries or limits” and “Immeasurably great or large.” There is some connection between the two meanings, clearly, but they are not identical. The former refers to the ontological status of the thing that is infinite, while the latter primarily refers to the ability to measure or gauge the thing said to be infinite. A thing can be practically immeasurable or unquantifiable without being limitless or boundless. I understand all of the above theological uses of the term infinite to be used in this latter sense.

But there is a theological use of the term with respect to human worth that does use the former sense, and this is with respect to the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ. As Anselm asks regarding Christ’s death the Cur Deus Homo of his dialogue partner Boso:

Anselm: And do you not think that so great a good in itself so lovely, can avail to pay what is due for the sins of the whole world?

Boso: Yes! it has even infinite value.

Later Boso says to Anselm, “Moreover, you have clearly shown the life of this man to have been so excellent and so glorious as to make ample satisfaction for the sins of the whole world, and even infinitely more.”

Only Christ’s life and death, as the God-man, is infinite in the sense of being boundless and limitless. All created being is by definition finite, and therefore not infinite in the first sense. Human life is infinite in the sense of not being able to be quantified in the latter sense.

For this reason, I think it is more proper to speak of human life as of immeasurable, inestimable, or inscrutable worth and value, rather than simply as of infinite value. Where the term infinite is used in a synonymous sense with these other terms, it may be acceptable. But it is more desirable to avoid possible confusion with the infinite value of Christ and use other, less ambiguous terms, instead of or as clarifiers for the word infinite.

“Cultural institutions are latching on to the issue of global warming to provide a focus and urgency to their work. At a time when museums and heritage organisations feel somewhat outdated and directionless, global warming provides a quick-fix rallying point….

This is an almighty cop-out. Institutions are avoiding the challenge of making history and science attractive to the public. Instead of inspiring visitors, institutions end up hectoring and lecturing them.”

Read the rest here: Josie Appleton, “The tide turns against culture,” sp!ked, Wednesday 31 May 2006.

Also check out the following piece from the Heartland Institute, which debunks a number of exaggerations and errors a recent issue of Time magazine: “Time‘s Climate Change Issue Rife with Deception,” by Marlo Lewis.

We often hear about the “need” for debt forgiveness. Our movie stars and celebrities like to clamour about it being a “moral obligation” and, of course, leaders of developing nations like the idea as well. But is debt forgiveness really going to help out the people of these developing nations? Samuel Gregg, Acton’s director of research, argues that debt forgiveness is not a moral obligation, nor is it necessarily such a great idea for the economies of some of these countries. Dr. Gregg examines the Republic of the Congo as an example of why debt forgiveness is a bad idea.

President Sassou-Nguesso is meeting with President Bush today, and will likely raise the topic of debt forgiveness. The average person in the Congo lives on about $2 a day. The nation does have a well supplied oil industry, although much of the revenue doesn’t ever make it to the marketplace.

Where does this money end up? Likely, it is diverted to extravagent spending for President Denis Sassou-Nguesso (for example, his 8-day, $295,000 trip to New York in 2005) and his entourage. Diverting monies from the oil industry hurts the economy directly by destroying the nations contractual accountability. In order for foreign investment to function well the investor needs to have some assurance that he will see profits and growth. If an economy tends to make money disappear, investment becomes unlikely. Dr. Gregg writes:

Allowing heavily indebted nations to walk away from their debts sends precisely the wrong economic signal to private and public international lenders of capital. Why should they lend any more funds to such countries in the future if they can never be sure their funds will be returned? Developing countries need to develop reputations as responsible borrowers who not only deploy the borrowed funds productively but who also repay their debts as contracted. How will debt forgiveness of a country like the Congo, especially given its extensive government corruption, help the Congo to achieve either goal?

The solutions to the problems of national poverty, especially in developing nations with rich natural resources and motivated, entrepreneurial, citizens lies in holding those nations’ leaders accountable rather than giving in to pleas for more money that can be further diverted into their own, personal treasuries.

For more information about debt forgiveness and solutions to poverty, look into our Impact campaign. The solution to poverty requires more than good intentions, it requires sound economics as well.

Related Items:

White House Press Office, “Remarks by President Bush and President Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo in a Photo Opportunity,” U.S. Newswire, June 5, 2006.

Associated Press, “Bush, President of Congo Discuss Darfur,” Washington Post, June 5, 2006.

Eli Lake, “Congo Battle Looms Over White House,” New York Sun, June 5, 2006.

Robert E. Wright, “Review of James Macdonald A Free Nation Deep in Debt: The Financial Roots of Democracy,” Economic History Services, May 31, 2006.

Marc Vander Maas, “Bono: Give Us a Call,” Acton Institute PowerBlog, May 19, 2006.

Jordan J. Ballor, “The Myth of Aid,” Acton Institute PowerBlog, May 15, 2006.

Samuel Gregg, Banking, Justice, and the Common Good. Grand Rapids: Acton Institute, 2005.

Jordan J. Ballor, “Movie Review: ‘The Debt of the Dictators’,” Acton Institute PowerBlog, July 21, 2005.

Osvaldo Schenone and Samuel Gregg, A Theory of Corruption. Grand Rapids: Acton Institute, 2003.

“Animals are less valuable than human beings,” says John Martin, Professor of Cardiovascular Medicine at University College London (UCL). This seemingly uncontroversial statement is under fire, as Helene Guldberg at sp!ked writes, “There seems to be an emerging consensus within the scientific community that we should reject the philosophical outlook that says humans are ‘categorically superior’ to animals.”

Keith Burgess-Jackson, who blogs at The Conservative Philosopher, says he is “an egalitarian about interspecific value,” and passes along the following quote:

For many philosophers, the consideration that may loom largest here is the stubborn conviction that the lives of normal humans must be of greater value than the lives of many, if not all, nonhuman animals. Perhaps that conviction is unjustified; it has not yet been very satisfyingly defended. (David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 248)

Princeton bioethicist Peter Singer is famous for equating the moral value of animals with newborn human beings, although he claims that “the aim of my argument is to elevate the status of animals rather than to lower the status of any humans” (Practical Ethics, p. 77).

In defending the position that humans are to be valued more than animals, Martin asks the right question: “What is a human being?” He argues that the answer “requires both a biological and a philosophical analysis – in tandem,” and that “what sets us apart from all other animals… is our ability to generate creative, abstract thought – ‘and with that, poetry, music and the social networks that bind us together’.” In this, Martin is partly right. But the answer to his question needs a theological as well as biological and philosophical analysis. (more…)

In some of my reading lately, a connection occurred to me of the sort that is so obvious once consciously realized that you feel almost idiotic for not making the linkage before. G. K. Chesterton considered logic to be a tool, an instrument of reason to be used only in service of the truth. He writes,

The relations of logic to truth depend, then, not upon its perfection as logic, but upon certain pre-logical faculties and certain pre-logical discoveries, upon the possession of those faculties, upon the power of making those discoveries. If a man starts with certain assumptions, he may be a good logician and a good citizen, a wise man, a successful figure. If he starts with certain other assumptions, he may be an equally good logician and a bankrupt, a criminal, a raving lunatic.

In this Chesterton is emphasizing the importance of first principles, or principia. He summarizes it this way: “You can only find truth with logic if you have already found truth without it” (G. K. Chesterton, Daily News, Feb. 25, 1905). Taken by itself, logic alone is ambivalent, in the sense that it can be pressed into the service either of truth or of falsehood.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer makes a similar observation with regard to the natural law, understood as distinct from and not dependent on special revelation. He writes, for example in the case of the state,

But both the concept of the contents of natural law are equivocal (depending on whether this natural law is derived from certain particular data or from certain particular standards); and it therefore fails to provide an adequate basis for the state. Natural law can furnish equally cogent arguments in favour of the state which is founded on force and the state which is founded on justice, for the nation-state and for imperialism, for democracy and for dictatorship (Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “State and Church,” in Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Neville Horton Smith [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995], 334).

In this way, Chesterton and Bonhoeffer make similar cases regarding the characteristics of logic and natural law, if both are abstracted from a dependence on biblical revelation.

This connection should not really be all that surprising, as Bonhoeffer himself identifies a created or natural law with reason: “Reason—law of what is created—of what exists” (Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “On the Possibility of the Church’s Message to the World,” in Ethics, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles West, and Douglass Stott, vol. 6, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005], 362).

All this follows a long tradition of relating natural law and reason in the Christian tradition, and is itself continuous with the contention of the Eminent Pagan, Cicero, who equates the two: “There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil” (Cicero, De Re Publica, Book III). Aquinas reiterates this connection, defining natural law as “the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law” (Summa Theologica, II.91.2).

Aquinas’ definition is cited approvingly by the Reformer Wolfgang Musculus, who says, “the lawe of nature is that light and iudgement of reason, whereby we doe discerne betwixt good and evill” (Wolfgang Musculus, Common places of Christian religion, trans. John Man [London: Henry Bynneman, 1578], 69). In this way, elements of both Protestant and Catholic natural law traditions have identified the natural law with “right reason,” picking up on the Ciceronian theme.

As Chesterton notes, the “rightness” of the reason depends on the proper foundation, that is, the truth of Biblical or special revelation. It is a fundamentally Augustinian point that reason alone, without illumination, cannot reach true first principles about the existence, attributes, and character of God. This is where the discontinuity between the pagan and Christian concepts of natural law come in. There is fundamental agreement about the methodology, so to speak, of natural law as “right reason,” but disagreement about the particular content of that rightness and the abilities of natural man to pursue it. For reason to be “right,” it needs the benefit of special revelation.

Hear ye, hear ye! The U.N. Environmental Programmmmme’s World Environment Day is June 5.

Wiki - The topic for WED 2006 is Deserts and Desertification. The slogan for WED 2006 is "Don´t desert drylands". The slogan emphasises the importance of protecting drylands, which cover more than 40% of the planet’s surface. This ecosystem is home to one-third of the world’s people who are more vulnerable members of society. The main international celebrations of the World Environment Day 2006 will be held in Algeria.

Don’t see much going on in the US for WED-06, though the folks in San Francisco put on a party last year.

This year, Pakistanis will plant 125,000 trees , corporate pioneers will be recognised by the European Union , desert wastelands are the highlight of discussions in Viet Nam, Filipinos are riding bikes (more here), Green Left Australians are highlighting old-growth forests, folks in India are having oil company sponsored quizzes and magic shows, Swaziland leadership attends conferences to "raise public awareness" (always a good reason), they’re planting trees in Malta, making post-cards in Antigua, demonstrating alternative power in Leeds (UK), and launching "green networks" in the Dominican Republic.

Tree Hugger sez I should have bought my new CIVIC in June to get a free gift from Mr. Honda (who knew?). Friends of the Earth are encouraging us to "organize events" to "raise awareness." Does blogging count? And my personal favorite: Lilongwe Hash House Harriers ("Drinkers with a running problem") have a note on their blog to visit a local nature sanctuary in honor of WED.

As I added 4th June in my calendar for the dedza hill walk, I noticed thatJune 3, Saturday, is the WESM LL World Environment Day learning thingy. The theme this year is Deserts and Desertification. Contact WESM LL for more details if you want to take part in the displays or give a talk or a walk around the LL Nature Sanctuary.

World Environment Day Learning thingy. Heh. Grab a six pack of your favorite adult beverage and wander down to your local park for a couple hours; just make sure to recycle those bottles and cans.

Oh, by the way, last Wednesday was World No Tobacco Day. If you missed it, you’re not alone.

[db also blogs at The Evangelical Ecologist.]

Abner Ramos, an alumnus of Acton’s September 2005 Toward a Free and Virtuous Society conference, experienced a change of heart not so long ago. In his work at the the East Los Angeles College Intervarsity Fellowship, he was seeing how some people displayed a sense of entitlement on matters of charity and financial assistance (like the students who were using financial aid checks to buy fancy wheels for their cars). And Abner, as he tells it on the El Acceso blog, came to the conclusion that some were simply taking advantage of his good will.

I’ve had to learn the hard way that in the ghetto, saying “no” is sometimes the best thing that you can do for people. I’ve had to learn the hard way that sometimes the poor aren’t as poor as they seem, and that they will sometimes take advantage of you once they figure out that you’re weak and have no discipline. I’ve had to learn that sometimes the poor that we work with are, well . . . lazy. Not only that, they’ve learned how to play the system to their advantage. I’ve learned that in my Christian desire to help people, I’ve actually enabled them to stay in poverty.

Abner credits his Acton education for helping him understand the problem and formulate a more effective response. Read his entire post here.

In an earlier post on illicit Catholic ordinations in China, I noted that there appeared to be a rift developing between the Patriotic Association and the rest of the government. Chinese Cardinal Joseph Zen confirmed that impression in remarks he made yesterday in Rome, as reported by AsiaNews:

The Patriotic Association wanted “it to be a slap in the face, but actually, they were defeated by the clear statement of the Holy See, to which the government responded very mildly”, continued Cardinal Zen.

The Chinese neo-cardinal said this low-key response meant that the government “has accepted this new evolution of the situation”. He added: “The Chinese government had clearly told Liu Bainian [PA vice-chairman] to stop these ordinations.”

Not directly, of course, but the implication of a recent story from NPR’s Future Tense is that video games have a positive stimulative effect on doctors who are about to perform surgery.

A new study is out, and according to FT, “Surgeons who played games for 20 minutes immediately prior to performing surgical drills were faster and made fewer errors.” The study focused on a particular type of surgery, specifically “laparoscopic” procedures. Again, from FT, “The results supported findings from a smaller study in 2003, which showed that doctors who grew up playing video games tended to be more efficient and less error-prone in laparoscopic training drills.” You can hear the story in RealMedia here.

The increase of dopamine associated with playing video games can help establish learning patterns. You heard it here first: students who play video games for 20 minutes immediately preceding quizzes, tests, midterms, and exams will perform better. Video games could “augment” educational achievement.

This latter claim would need to be studied and proven, of course. It seems to me that today’s youth already play significant amounts of video games. It may well be that long-term and extended durations of video game play might have adverse effects on learning patterns as wel. This means that we’d need to look for a mediating time frame, within which the brain is stimulated and activated but does not suffer from more adverse effects.

Maybe the circumscribed use of video games can be part of the solution to the problem Anthony Bradley identifies.

Update: “The Brain Workout: In praise of video games,” OpinionJournal, by Brian C. Anderson: “Video games can also exercise the brain in remarkable ways.”

Rodney Dangerfield is famous for saying, “I don’t get no respect!” This complaint is shared in the laments that I often hear from academics, that electronic journals are not afforded the same respect as print journals. I explored some of the reasons for this as well as some of the results that have implications for journal publishers in an article published last year, “Scholarship at the Crossroads: The Journal of Markets & Morality Case Study,” Journal of Scholarly Publishing 36, no. 3 (April 2005).

The basic argument in favor of affording electronic journals the same prestige and status as print journals is that they both are based on the same fundamental quality-control process: peer review. In reality, however, all peer review is not created equal. There are practical differences in what various journals call peer review, how they exercise it, and the self-imposed rigor and depth of external reviews. But even if all peer review were qualitatively equal, there are other factors that contribute to the perception that electronic journals deserve less respect.

The fact is that there are very few, if any, practical constraints on the number and length of articles that could be published by an electronic journal. A print journal has a definite maximum number of pages per issue and volume that can be printed. This creates scarcity, and thus a perception if not the reality of increased value, since only a select number of articles can be printed. No such limits exist in the digital medium, so that such constraints must be voluntarily and rigorously enforced by electronic journal publishers if they are to mimic the dynamics of this aspect of traditional journal publishing.

One other observation I’d like to make is that the advent of e-journals has really sparked the proliferation and diversification of journal publishing. This mirrors and catalyzes the increasing specialization of academic disciplines. For example, the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) lists 90 titles under the subject heading “History”. Some journals are focused on narrow geographical areas and historical periods, such as The Heroic Age: A Journal of Early Medieval Northwestern Europe.

To be sure, some academic disciplines, such as literature and gender studies, lend themselves to greater fracturing and diversification, so that Cervantes or Flaubert have their own dedicated e-journals. It’s entirely likely, for example, that the typical tenure review board member is going to value an article published in Electronic Journal of Human Sexuality somewhat less than one appearing in the American Journal of Sociology. In addition, peer review takes on a different shape if there are very few scholars who are true specialists in a particular area of research.

Certainly many scholars will argue that this embodies the democratization of education and academics, in that fields are no longer monopolized by a few traditional and academically conservative journals. But at the same time scholars must realize that the obscurity and extreme specialization of some of e-journals contributes greatly to their lack of prestige.

One concrete way for electronic journals as a medium to gain respect, especially in the humanistic fields, would be for major, established, respected journals to make the move from print to digital. Otherwise, electronic journals that are almost always less than a decade-old will struggle to get respect.